

AMPO

AMPO



A Report from the Japanese New Left



AMPO 70

Part 1: OKINAWA

In November Prime Minister Eisaku Sato is going to Washington to meet with President Nixon and negotiate the return of the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) to Japanese sovereignty. The radical left in Japan...students, young workers, and citizens' groups...are planning massive demonstrations to

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Socialist Party, Anti-War Youth League sections of the membership of the independence of theNovember, 1969

AMPO interviews

⇒ MAKOTO ODA ←

AMPO: What do you think that Beheiren has introduced into Japanese politics that's new?

ODA: (laughing) That's really a difficult question. Let's see...what can I say? Turn it off for a minute, will you?

(tape recorder turned off temporarily, while Oda thinks, then restarted.)

ODA: This can be said about the peace movement all over the world, but I'll speak particularly about the peace movement in Japan, since I've been connected with it for a long time...

TSURUMI: (interpreting) What's that? Since what?


ODA: "Since..." oh Hell!

TSURUMI: Well then, speak English.

ODA: (laughing, speaks in English)...especially in Japan, since I have been deeply connected with the Japanese movement, so I think one of the characteristics of the Beheiren movement is...(in Japanese) how should I put it (laughing again)...

TSURUMI: In Japanese is better.

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Makoto Oda is the chairman of Beheiren, an active critic of America's Asia policy, and a best-selling novelist. He has made three trips to America, and hopes to go again this fall, during Prime Minister's visit.

JAPAN'S "SELF-DEFENSE FORCE" HOLD ANTI-RIOT MANEUVERS

The Japanese public was recently shocked to learn that the country's 157,000-man Ground Self-Defense Force has been engaged for some time in special training for quelling demonstrations. Members of the press were invited to a demonstration of the anti-riot maneuvers of the GSDP on the afternoon of October 3. The maneuvers were held at the Higashi-Fuji training grounds at the foot of Mt. Fuji in Shizuoka prefecture.


Some 210 members of the 1st Division of the Eastern Corps of the GSDP (artillery) took part in the mock riot control unit, supported by a tank, two armored cars, a bulldozer, a chemical fire-fighting truck, and a water cannon truck. Some 300 GSDP men played the role of rioters, wearing helmets and throwing imitation Molotov cocktails and rocks. In the exercises shown to the press, the "rioters" were subdued in about 35 minutes. Other exercises involved the landing of 86 GSDP men in camouflage uniforms from helicopters onto a hill representing the roof of a building. A mock barricade made of old automobiles, tires, drum cans, and wood was set afire, and the "rioters" were arrested by riot unit members wearing gas masks.

Persistent press reports have indicated that GSDP units in the vicinity of the nation's larger cities have been undergoing intensive anti-riot training during recent months. Eye-witnesses reported seeing such drills conducted by as many as 600 men between the months of April and August. The Japan Times reports that many units log 600 hours of exercise for anti-riot purposes in one year. This would amount to nearly one-third of all their combat training schedules. (Oct. 4)

The Asahi Shimbun (Oct. 4) also reports that some 20,000 men from the GSDP units stationed in and around Tokyo could be mobilized for anti-riot duty in the capital if the order is given by the Prime Minister. In addition, about half of the entire GSDP manpower (total strength 157,000 men) throughout Japan could be put into anti-riot action if needed.

The recently publicized maneuvers were reportedly intended to have a "preventive effect" in giving warning that the Defense Forces are standing behind the police. However, Defense Agency officials say that it would be undesirable for the GSDP forces to go into action against the Japanese public.

There are serious doubts about the legality of the Defense Forces, since Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan shall have no armed forces. In a statement to the Mainichi Shimbun (Oct. 4), Japanese novelist Hiroshi Noma stated: "Anti-riot training of the Self-Defense Forces is absolutely wrong. In my opinion, the very existence of the Self-Defense Forces is a violation of the Constitution.... This appears to be a preventive offensive aimed at the anti-Security Treaty movement. For them to aim their guns at their own compatriots is tantamount to aiming against their own flesh and blood. Even the old Imperial Army never went so far as to go into action against other Japanese. I think that the general public ought to raise their voices loud and strong in opposition to such a tendency."



Tadanori Yokoo

OVER 5,000 MILITANT STUDENTS ARRESTED IN TOKYO

With the arrest of 10 students at Tokyo University of Education on September 17, the Metropolitan Police Department announced that the number of radical students arrested in Tokyo so far this year had reached a total of 5,001.

The number of student uprisings this year in which arrests were made in Tokyo totaled 218. Of the 5,001 arrested, altogether 2,994 were detained for criminal investigation, and 1,314 were indicted. 317 students are now being held in detention while tried in court.

The top three incidents producing the largest numbers of arrests this year were the following:

- Okinawa Day (April 28).....1,020 arrested
- Tokyo University Struggle and Kanda "Latin Quarter" Struggle (January 18-19).... 780 arrested
- Struggle to Prevent Foreign Minister Aichi's Visit to the U.S. (May 31)..... 357 arrested

The number of students arrested throughout all Japan since the present wave of student militancy began at the Haneda Struggle on October 8, 1967 has now reached a total of 10,480.

ANTI-WAR YOUTH COMMITTEES PLAYING LEADING ROLE

An "All-Kanto Anti-War Rally" was held in Tokyo on September 15 under the sponsorship of the Tokyo area federation of Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen). Some 5,500 workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees attended. They came from Tokyo and the surrounding Kanto prefectures. The rally reaffirmed opposition to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, support for the Okinawan struggle, and confrontation to oppose forcefully Prime Minister Sato's visit to the United States in November.

Messages of solidarity were delivered at the rally by representatives of Chinese students in Japan, representatives of the Struggle Committee of Okinawan Students, and Americans representing the Black Panther Party and the S.D.S. During the demonstrations following the rally, 14 persons were arrested by the riot police for snake dancing.

The Anti-War Youth Committees are organizations of workers belonging to various new radical factions. Organized on an industry-wide or a local basis, the Anti-War Committees were born as a result of the criticism by young workers of established political parties and organizations. In the past, there have been sharp disagreements over theoretical questions within the committees, but recently there has been a growing cohesion as members united to form a strong joint-struggle system in preparation for the departure of Prime Minister Sato for his U.S.A. visit in November. The September 15 rally also was a step in this direction.

Both the Japanese Communist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyo) have completely disowned the Anti-War Youth Committees. In this they developed difference of opinion with the Japan Socialist Party, which wants to co-opt Hansen by "supporting" and "guiding" it. However, at a summit meeting between Sohyo and the Socialist Party on September 15, it was agreed to establish a new "Anti-Security Treaty, Anti-War Youth Central Council" under their monopoly control. Nevertheless, large sections of the membership of the Anti-War Youth organizations have asserted their independence of the Socialist Party and Sohyo.

AVPO

A Report from The Japanese New Left

AMPO is produced by Beheiren (The Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee) and Gaikokujin Beheiren, its affiliate organization for foreign residents in Japan. AMPO is a movement publication designed to overcome the fact that the Japanese Left, one of the most articulate and active movements in the world, is covered by a blanket of silence in all languages but Japanese.

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It is our specific hope that this magazine will contribute to unified action in 1970 against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which is an enemy of the people of both countries, and of the people of all Asia.

Any suggestions -- either for this magazine or for unified action -- will be greatly appreciated.

Editorial Committee: Makoto Oda, Yuichi Yoshikawa, Yoshiyuki Tsurumi, Ichio Muto, Lafcadio Black, Gerry Winstanley



RIOT POLICE TO BE BEEFED UP

According to Akira Hatano, superintendent of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department, it will be necessary to adopt emergency measures to cope with expected increases in street violence connected with attempts by militant students to stop Prime Minister Sato's visit to the United States in November.

Speaking at a press conference on September 3, Hatano announced that the MPD will do everything to crush strongholds of student insurgents in university campuses and on the streets. It was announced that the Tokyo police force will organize 25,000 policemen, or 68% of the total MPD force, for use in riot squads in the event of major street violence.

The new emergency measures will begin on October 1 and will remain in effect for one year. The special riot police force will comprise almost all policemen under 43 years of age and below the rank of assistant police inspector. When the emergency squads are organized, most of the city's police boxes and patrolcars will be manned by policemen over the age of 45.

Hatano was quoted by the Japan Times as saying that "leaders of student movements in Europe and the Negro struggles in the United States were switching to peaceful tactics because violent struggles had proved to be fruitless." He hoped that Japanese students would follow suit. (Sept. 4)



Unbelievable?
See page 7.

October 21, Japan's Mightiest Anti-war Day

On October 21, celebrated as International Anti-War Day in Japan, unified rallies were held in 832 places in all of Japan's 46 prefectures. The largest meetings were those held in Tokyo, Osaka, Sapporo and Fukuoka.

The October 21 rallies have become a tradition among Japan's anti-war forces. On October 21, 1968, the popular demonstrations in Tokyo's Shinjuku area reached insurrection proportions, and the notorious Anti-Riot Law (Sōranzai) was applied by the authorities. This year, the police, fearing that the confusion might surpass last year's levels, took unprecedented security measures, and a total of 1,505 arrests (including 100 women) were made throughout Japan. The arrests in Tokyo numbered 1,221 (including 80 women). This was the largest number of arrests ever made in a single day in Japan's history. Despite the unparalleled police security measures, guerrilla units armed with Molotov cocktails went into action in many localities, barricades were hastily built for street fighting in downtown Tokyo, and both the national and private railways were shut down for hours on account of the fighting.

The October 21 struggle is considered to be the key struggle auguring the success or failure of the entire series of struggles against the Security Treaty scheduled for the rest of 1969 and for 1970. Both the New Left and the Old Left came out in full force to demonstrate their will.

Let's examine what October 21 means for the Japanese anti-war forces and what the Japanese New Left was aiming to accomplish on this date.

* * * * *

The anti-JCP political groupings, which first appeared on the scene

(Continued on page 12)



There are times of loneliness.....

Beheiren


by Yoshiyuki Tsurumi

"The trouble," complained an earnest young Marxist, "is that people join Beheiren just because it's kakko-ii (groovy). In politics you have to be more serious."

"Beheiren," stated the Public Safety Commissioner in his report to the Cabinet on the eve of the June 15 demonstration, "is as powerless as flies. They will be unable to mobilize more than 15,000."

The June 15 demonstration may well be remembered as an historical turning point for the left. At the same time, it was their success in organizing the June 15 demonstration that revealed that Beheiren, the exciting, kakko-ii gadfly of the opposition, has emerged as a major, and dead serious, political power. This demonstration, which was in opposition to the Vietnam War, in opposition to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and in favor of the liberation of Okinawa, was significant for several reasons. It was the first time since 1960 that united action was taken by all major groups of the New Left...students, young workers, and citizen groups. Since it is vital for the government to keep these groups sectarian and divided, this unity was a matter for grave official concern. Moreover, the number of participants was startlingly higher than all expectations. Some 75,000 people filled the streets that day...when the head of the march reached its destination 5 kilometers away thousands were still waiting in the park for their turn to leave, and the Public Safety Minister was forced to apologize to the Prime Minister for his absurd underestimate. (To understand the importance of these numbers it is important to realize that none of the "established" opposition groups...

(Continued on page 8)



.....music.....



.....and fellowship.

JATEC THE STORY OF A DESERTER

In November 11, 1967, Beheiren announced the desertion of four American sailors from the carrier Intrepid. It was this event that marked the beginning of JATEC (Japan Technical Committee to Aid Anti-War Deserters) which up to the present has aided sixteen deserters in successfully leaving Japan.

JATEC of course does not make public the details of its operations. But it is clear that through JATEC a very large number of people are engaged both in making anti-war appeals to soldiers and in offering support to those who choose to desert.

Japan is in a special position with respect to U.S. deserters for two reasons. First of all, many U.S. soldiers come to this country. Not only is Japan one of the major supply bases for the U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and Okinawa a base for B52 bombing runs to Vietnam, but also it is the largest R&R (Rest and Rehabilitation) area in the Far East for American combat troops. Most of the soldiers sent to Vietnam are given a one week holiday in Japan. Thus off-duty soldiers in civilian clothes are commonly seen enjoying holidays in Tokyo and other cities. Here they have many chances to talk to people, especially students who are their own age and who can speak English, and thus can easily find an opportunity to contact JATEC. JATEC is well described as a "fish swimming in the sea of Japanese people."

Secondly, through a peculiarity of the law, it is not a crime in Japan to make anti-war appeals to soldiers, to support them if they desert, or to help them escape from the country. While the people engaged in these activities are harassed both openly and secretly by the authorities, the police are not able to make arrests.

The purposes of JATEC is not, however, limited to helping deserters travel from Japan to such places as Sweden. The Constitution of Japan renounces war, and this renunciation is taken seriously by the people, if not by the government. For the people it is a matter of course that this country should offer asylum and a permanent home for deserters. Thus the ultimate aim of JATEC is to establish the right of political refuge in Japan, a right which the Government does not now acknowledge.

Daniel Dennis, the subject of the following account, deserted the U.S. Army and began civilian life illegally in Japan, with the support of JATEC and Beheiren.

THE STORY OF A DESERTER

Takashi Yoshimura

translated from Shukan Ampo

On May 15, 1969, friends and sympathizers of Danny D. Dennis sat in front of the Kawabata Police Station to protest the arrest of their friend. But they could do nothing. While police attacked the sitters, Dennis was driven away in an M.P. car against tears and protests of the helpless crowd. Who was this criminal? This is the story of a young boy who deserted from the U.S. Army because he didn't want to kill.

Who are you Paul? "I am Danny D. Dennis, alias Paul E. Simon. (I picked that name because I like the song 'Sounds of Silence' by Simon and Garfunkel)."

Paul came to Kyoto on a cold night in November. Warming himself by a stove in a quiet hotel near Kinkakuji, he spoke of himself to a Beheiren member.

He was born in St. Louis on November 26, 1949; he enlisted in the army in November 1966, at the age of 17. At this time he felt he wanted to serve in the army but in April of 1968 when he was faced with the prospect of going to Vietnam, he deserted for the first time. After 60 days, he was picked up by the M.P.'s and in the end he had no choice but to go to Vietnam and fight.

In October of 1968 he was wounded and sent to Tachikawa Base. From there he was transferred to the military hospital at Zama. While recuperating within the concrete walls, he had many long hours to ponder the senseless war he had seen.

Of the many horrible things he had witnessed, there was one scene he could not erase from his memory. His company had attacked a small village and all the people had fled except one small girl. She was alone and frightened and crying for her mother. One soldier began teasing the child and she cried loudly. The other soldiers were all laughing and the soldier became irritated and began shaking the child to make her stop crying. When she only screamed louder, he picked her up and threw her against a tree, crushing her small body. The crying stopped and there was silence. Soon the child was dead. The soldier turned away from the tiny corpse, lit a cigarette and walked away.

Paul knew he could no longer participate in this nightmare of cruelty. He decided to desert for the second time. On October 28, 1968, he disappeared from the hospital in Zama.

Why did he desert? Some people think that all deserters are cowards. Some people think that all deserters are heroes. But in truth, the average deserter is neither. He is nothing but an average human being.

And that was Paul; not a coward, not a hero, but an average American boy. On November 26 he had a birthday. The members of JATEC (The Japan Technical Committee for the Assistance of Anti-War U.S. Deserters) had a party for him. They listened to the song, "Cruel War" by Peter, Paul and Mary. Dennis liked this song. He felt the relation between the song and his life and many other lives which were torn apart by the war.

He became extremely interested in the peace movement in Japan and also in the Japanese people. He began to ask the members of JATEC how they felt about such things as Buddhism, individualism, conformism, etc. The members had a difficult time trying to answer all of his serious and deep questions in English.

Dennis was very pensive in those days. He was only a boy but in deserting from the army he had made an immense decision. The members often wondered what he was pondering but they could not understand the agony he was going through.

Early one morning in December, Dennis woke a member of Beheiren and told him that he was going to turn himself in. He said he hadn't slept all night trying to come to a decision.

Why? Dennis answered slowly, "If I go to Sweden or remain in Japan, I will have only freed myself. I want to help other people to free

themselves. I want to begin working in the Anti-war movement within the army. If I return now, I will only be punished for going AWOL and that's not too serious. Then I can begin my work.

This was a difficult decision to make. How could he exist in the army when his moral beliefs condemned its every action? It is difficult, to say the least, to organize for peace within the world's largest and most powerful military machine. Yet as a deserter, he couldn't do much in a country where he could be arrested at any moment. In the end, he was persuaded to remain a deserter and the ard of JATEC.

Most people thought Dennis was Paul E. Simon, a student. Only a few close friends knew his real story. In order to support himself and his dog Dusty, he began teaching private English classes.

On the morning of March 12, he left home to take a walk. Soon after leaving he was stopped by a policeman for a "routine check." Of course he had no passport with him and he was taken to the Kawabata Police Station for questioning. At that time the police had no idea that Dennis was a deserter.

At 3 p.m. he was arrested for violation of the immigration law, (entering the country without a valid passport or visa). Immediately Mr. Ono, a lawyer and member of Beheiren, was called and he went with an interpreter to the station. The police had already phoned the immigration officials and informed them they were holding a boy who could not produce a passport.

No one knew why Dennis had been arrested. All they could think of was that he was dressed somewhat too casually. He did not look like the average tourist.

At 9 p.m. Professor Shunsuke Tsurumi called a meeting of the members of Kyoto Beheiren to discuss what could be done for Dennis. They knew that the police didn't know that Dennis was a deserter yet, but they also knew that it was only a matter of time before they found out.

All during that night, eight young students watched the front and rear entrances of the police station. They knew that something was going on. The lights of the police station burned all night.

Morning came and no one had slept all night. Dennis inside the station, the students watching the station and the members who were trying to plan what they could do to best support him. They finally decided to have a press conference and make public his plight.

At 12 noon on the 13th, the lawyer contacted the members for the third time. He told them the police had not yet discovered that Dennis was a deserter. He said that the only way to save Dennis was to take the case to court. Under Japanese law, military are not under the jurisdiction of the immigration laws, but the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. So actually he had not broken the law he was arrested for. But if Beheiren had a press conference and publicized his real position before the trial, he would only be arrested again for the law he had broken.

It was a difficult decision to make. After discussing the alternatives with Dennis, he decided to tell the truth. The lawyer began legal proceedings at 11 p.m.

At the same time Beheiren held a press conference to tell the Japanese people the plight of a deserter in their country. Dennis had wanted to take political refuge in this country and had even written to Sato asking to be allowed to stay. But because there are no laws to protect political exiles, Dennis was arrested although he had broken no Japanese law.

About 1 a.m. on the 14th, 30 demonstrators gathered in front of the police office and sang, "We Shall Overcome." They stayed until the term of the 14th at which time two were arrested.

Although Dennis had admitted that he was a deserter, there was still no proof and the police, tied in their own red tape, began proceedings for violation of the immigration law. About 100 more people joined the demonstrators protesting the arrest. Many people who had known Dennis were cry-

ing but they were helpless to protect him. They could only stand outside the walls where he was being held and shout:

"Don't give up Paul, you're not alone."

"We shall overcome."

"We'll stop the Vietnam war together."

"We'll never forget you."

At about 2:45 p.m. Monday, the 15th, the M.P.'s arrived. The crowd began to shout, "Army go home."

The original warrant was cancelled and Dennis was "set free." Thirty seconds later he was arrested for violation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

The crowd outside stood anxiously wondering what to do. At 3:40 p.m. Dennis, several Japanese policeman and M.P.'s came out of the front entrance. About 100 riot policemen stood by to see what the crowd would do. The demonstrators surrounded the door, sat down and hooked arms to prevent them from leaving with Dennis. The riot police charged into the crowd, beating them and pulling them apart. One student fell to the ground, his head bleeding. While they were being beaten, the crowd continued to sing, "We Shall Overcome." All were crying and as Dennis was being led away from them they again shouted that they would never forget him. But it was futile. Dennis was pushed into a car and driven away.

Two Beheiren members jumped into a car and tried to follow but their car was blocked by the riot police and they were arrested. But Beheiren had another car behind the station and the police didn't notice them following Dennis west down the Meishin Highway.

It looked as if they were going straight to the Itami Airport in Osaka but suddenly the police car swerved left and turned into the Shinmeiwas Company. This company repairs U.S. bombers which have been shot down by the Vietnamese people. It is well known munitions factory. Last year the Revolutionary Marxist Student League called the attention of the public to the activities of this company and since that time the company claims to have discontinued the production of ammunition.

The gate was heavily guarded by police and the Beheiren car had no choice but to go on to the airport and wait. That evening they watched a small military Cessna fly east. In it was their friend.

On the 16th Mr. Oka, a lawyer and a member of Tokyo Beheiren, went to Zama Army Base. There he met Lieutenant Colonel Senader, the chief of the judicial division of U.S. Headquarters, and was told that Dennis was being held in the stockade at Tachikawa. On the morning of the 20th, Mr. Oka met Dennis. Also present was Nancy Hunter, an American lawyer. Dennis seemed healthy.

One thing was made very clear by Dennis' case. The Japanese police, munitions, capitalists and court were going to work together to fight these powers.

Dennis' case came to court early in June. Perhaps because of the concern of his friends, he was given the lightest sentence possible. He was charged only with AWOL and sentenced to 6 months hard labor. Beheiren members felt that their efforts had not been in vain.

OCTOBER 10 DEMONSTRATION


The New Left emerged in force today in nation-wide unified rallies marking the start of the fall offensive against the renewal of the Japan-American Security Treaty and the betrayal of Okinawa.

The protest of an estimated eighty thousand Tokyo workers, students and citizens, and tens of thousands of others in cities throughout Japan was the largest demonstration in the present Ampo struggle.


The demonstrators, flying colorful banners and marching in zig-zag formation through Tokyo, included the full range of New Left forces: the anti-war youth movement (the militant wing of organized labor), radical student groups including the all-campus struggle movement (Zenkyōtō), and the previously isolated Revolutionary Marxists (Kakumarū), as well as Beihiren and other citizens groups. In short, the march united all radical and peace forces critical of the Sato administration and the passive stance of the established opposition -- the Socialist and Communist parties and the General Council of Labor Unions (Sohyō).

In the face of a popular upsurge, the escalation of police repression was clearly evident. The police were marshalled 10,000 men strong, arranged 5-deep behind medieval chest-high shields but equipped with an awesome array of electronic communications and mobile equipment. The lines between the two Japans were sharply drawn. If the demonstrators succeeded in conveying to thousands of onlookers and massive media coverage the numbers and determination of the movement, the police tactics undoubtedly curbed the full impact of the movement. The show of police force isolated the peaceful marchers from the watching crowds, and inhibited ordinary citizens, un-equipped with helmets, from participating in what was in fact an extraordinarily peaceful demonstration.

The unified rally, following a similar meeting last June, was probably the last of its kind in the present struggle. In the coming months, the participating groups can be expected to experiment with a variety of new approaches to mobilizing popular support, including confrontation struggles culminating in the mid-November effort to prevent Sato's visit to the United States.



Tear gas canisters are commonly fired directly at demonstrators by the Riot Police.



Riot Police with Duralumin shields block off Tokyo streets as militant students demonstrate on October 10.

NATIONAL STUDENT FEDERATION FORMED

On September 5, Tokyo's Hibiya Park was the scene of a massive rally at which a new student organization was born: the National Federation of All-campus Joint Struggle Councils (zenkoku Zenkyōtō Rengō).

Zenkyōtō (All-campus Joint Struggle Council) is a type of student struggle organization in which students participate on a voluntary basis. Such organizations, which may be of a campus-wide or a department-wide scope, have become the main motive forces for carrying on university struggles during the latter half of the 1960s. There are at present Zenkyōtō organizations at 178 Japanese universities. Some 30,000 students from 46 different universities participated in the September 5 rally at Hibiya.

The new national federation centers in a united front formed by eight factions of radical students. Their chief aim is to defeat the imperialistic reorganization of Japanese society. Currently, the main slogans are to crush the University Control Law (forcibly enacted by the Liberal Democratic Party in the Diet in August) and to oppose the Japanese-American Security Treaty in 1970. The national Zenkyōtō federation differs, both in organization and theoretical approach, from the "Zengakuren," which was a national federation of student self-government organizations. The "Zengakuren" was organized on the basis of compulsory membership of the entire student body on a given campus.

More than 5,000 riot police surrounded Hibiya Park on September 5, and participants in the meeting were subjected to inspections at numerous checkpoints on the way to the park. The representative of the Zenkyōtō organization at Tokyo University, Yoshitaka Yamamoto, was elected president of the new national federation, but was arrested as he attempted to enter the meeting grounds. This arrest was made 228 days after the warrant for his arrest was issued. He was arrested for the part he allegedly played in the Yasuda Auditorium struggle at Tokyo University on January 18-19 of this year.

The national Zenkyōtō federation vowed to fight in the front ranks of the 1970 political struggle under the slogans: "Crush the Security Treaty!" "Victory to the Okinawa Struggle!" and "Prevent Prime Minister Sato's Visit to the U.S. in November!"

HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS BECOME POLITICALLY ACTIVE

A rally was held in Tokyo on September 27 to form a high-school students' joint struggle committee to smash the Security Treaty. The committee was organized by high school students of various new radical factions. 500 high-school students from about 50 schools in the Kanto area participated in the rally. Resolutions called for the launching of barricade strikes at high schools all over Japan on October 21, for physical confrontation struggles based at Tokyo high schools, and for a determined struggle to prevent the departure of Prime Minister Sato on his visit to the United States in November.

In September, Zenkyōtō (All-campus Joint Struggle Council) organizations were formed at the Metropolitan Aoyama High School in Tokyo and at various other high schools in Tokyo and in the Kansai area. There appears to be an ever-growing upsurge of militant activity by high-school students belonging to the various radical factions excepting the Communist Party of Japan in preparation for the October and November struggles aimed at preventing Sato's U.S. visit.

Also on September 27, a rally was held to form a nation-wide rightist group for high school students, identified as a movement of "anti-communist, nationalist high-school students." 200 students from 27 public and private high schools all over Japan participated in this rally under slogans of "down with the movement of the leftist high-school students!" and "smash the imminent communist revolution!" The rightists appear to be preparing for a showdown with radical high-school students and with the Zenkyōtō movement.

STUDENTS MAKE PUBLIC

CAPTURED UNIVERSITY DOCUMENTS

The All-campus Struggle Committee of Osaka University (Zenkyōtō) on September 18 made public secret university documents which were discovered on the campus, now shut down by a barricade strike. The documents included a list of prospective sources from which monetary contributions were solicited as well as contracts for research grants.

Soliciting of monetary contributions apparently started in April, 1968 with the aim of expanding the university facilities. A goal of ¥10 billion was set. In addition to many prominent companies in various sectors of industry, the list also included the Defence Agency and the Communications Section of the Police Agency.

The students recalled that university administrators constantly harp on academic freedom and independence of the university. These documents, they said, proved that the university itself is bartering away its own freedom and is seeking to rely more and more on big business. "What sort of university is this," they asked, "which seeks contributions from the Defence Agency and the police?"

POLICE INTRUSIONS ON CAMPUSES

Masuo Araki, chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, on September 26 told a meeting of the Japanese cabinet that police have entered strife-torn Japanese university and college campuses 337 times so far this year. This figure was far in excess of the 1968 figure of 31 times.

Araki reported that in 232 of these cases the police intervention was requested by the universities themselves, as compared with only seven cases in the previous year. This indicates, he said, that university officials are "more serious in trying to normalize their campuses."

According to the report, the police entered universities and colleges 107 times for the purpose of evicting entrenched radical students, 95 times to guard campuses from infiltration by radicals, and 92 times to search and seize "weapons."

Riot police intervention was requested 208 times by national universities, 26 times by public institutions, and 133 times by private universities and colleges.

According to Araki, most cases of police intervention into fights between militant groups of students were related to the deeply rooted hostility between militant leftists and "moderate" students affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party.

BARRICADES REMOVED FROM KYOTO UNIVERSITY

On September 21, and 22, 2,000 riot police were sent into Kyoto University (a national university) to remove barricades set up by Zenkyōtō students who had been occupying the campus. The police forces used helicopters, water hoses, and tear gas to evict the students, who resisted stiffly, throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. After being evicted from the campus, the students switched to guerilla tactics in the streets around the university. Students demonstrated and hurled rocks in a number of places. One police transport truck was burned after it was hit by a fire bomb.

Eleven young assistant professors and assistants had staged a sit-down in front of the main building of the Department of Agriculture to protest against the invasion of the university by the riot police. They were arrested for failure to disperse at police order. This was the first time that faculty members have ever been arrested during a campus dispute in Japan. During the guerilla fighting and during the invasions of the Department of Medicine and of the clock tower, 54 students (including 7 girls) were arrested for various charges such as interference with official duties and assembling with dangerous weapons.

At a conference of police chiefs held on September 9 at the Metropolitan Police Department in Tokyo, superintendent Hatano of the MPD had given orders to "repress strictly extremist activities during the struggles to prevent Sato's visit to the United States and during the 1970 Security Treaty struggles." Police tactics shifted to a policy of "preventive attack". Efforts are now being centered on forcible searches of universities used by students as bases for their struggles, and on preventive arrests of militant students. As the University Control Law goes into effect, it is expected that the riot police will invade campuses more and more frequently.



Beheiren

(Continued from page 5)

Japan Socialist Party, J.C.P., or the labor unions...were involved.) Finally, despite the participation of highly militant student and young worker sects, the demonstration was not violent. It did not need to be; simply by virtue of its unity and numbers, it was a major political event.

But what is truly interesting about Beheiren is not only its expanding power and numbers, but the fact that it embodies a manner and style of common action which is fundamentally new to Japanese politics. As everyone knows, politics in this country has been plagued by factionalism. As George Packard put it in his well documented book, *Protest in Tokyo*, "Japanese political organizations are characteristically closed groups with intricate rules for entry and mobility..." and there has consequently been little room for mass participation in the political process. The Establishment has been able to make double use of this fact. On the one hand, highly bureaucratic opposition groups, by definition controlled from the top, are relatively easy to co-opt and control. On the other hand, if the opposition groups do succeed in mounting a powerful movement, as in 1960, the government can counter with the argument that those groups are not "representative." Thus in 1960, in the midst of the anti-Security Treaty demonstrations which were to cost him his office, Prime Minister Kishi stated at a press conference, "I think that we must incline our ears to the voiceless voices. What we hear now are only the audible voices, that is all." This remarkable doctrine, that one should give more political weight to silence than to speech and action, (not to mention Kishi's arrogant assumption that he was free to hear the "voiceless voices" as speaking in his favor), provoked a schoolteacher, Miss Tomi Kobayashi, to form the "Voiceless Voice Group." made up largely of ordinary citizens

and white collar workers, which took to the streets of Tokyo alongside the labor unions, party organizations, and student groups.

While the "Voiceless Voice Group" did not itself become an important power, its fundamental inspiration is embodied today in Beheiren, which was first formed in April 1965 (immediately after the bombing of North Vietnam began). But it was not only that Beheiren was built to give voices to those "ordinary citizens" who were excluded from the great bureaucratic leftist organizations, but also that, in the process of doing so, it developed its own strikingly anti-bureaucratic mode of action. Beheiren operates in a way which violates the fundamental "principles of organization" which are honored practically everywhere by industries, armies, government bureaucracies, and opposition parties. It is perhaps the axiom of such organizations that spontaneity is the enemy of collective action, and that without hierarchical structure, and a careful limiting of human action by rules, regulations, and an organizational ideology, it is impossible for people to accomplish anything jointly. It is for this reason that Beheiren insists that it is a "movement" rather than an "organization." The difference is enlightening: an organization is a structure in which action (movement) is contained, controlled, and limited; Beheiren, by contrast, is the embodiment of pure action.

Beheiren has no ideology, but is loosely united around three principles: Peace in Vietnam; Vietnam for the Vietnamese; Opposition to the Japanese Government's complicity in the Vietnam war. The only organizational rule is in fact an anti-rule: any group that wants to call itself Beheiren can do so and can initiate its own actions in the name of Beheiren. It is true that something like a hierarchy might seem to appear if all the Beheiren chapters were laid out on an organization chart...at least one would discover that there is a central office in Tokyo, a Chairman, Makoto Oda, and a General Secretary, Yuuichi Yoshikawa. But in order for this to be a true hierarchy, these upper and lower levels would have to be linked by "orders" flowing down from the top. But in fact there is no such thing; the more than 250 Beheiren's are held together in practice not by orders or rules or even by unified policy, but by ideas and proposals which flow in all directions. Each group is entirely responsible for the form and content of its own activities. Good ideas, actions that prove effective, naturally tend to spread, and of course when large scale actions are planned, many groups and individuals must be persuaded to participate. And while many of the successful actions have originated in the Tokyo central office, many others have originated elsewhere...a notable recent example being this summer's Anti-War Expo 69 held in Osaka, which was conceived and largely carried out by Kansai Beheiren.

The list of important Beheiren actions in its short four years of existence is impressive. In 1965 Beheiren sponsored Japan's first 24 hour Vietnam war teach-in, televised nationally and participated in by, among others, Carl Oglesby from the U.S. As a result of a proposal made at that conference, there followed a national campaign to raise money to place a full-page ad in the N.Y. Times expressing opposition to the war. While in retrospect this may seem like a minor act, it helped to overcome the Japanese habit of mind that money and information flow only from the U.S. to Japan, and never the reverse. In 1966 a Beheiren group, together with Howard Zinn of Boston U. and Ralph Featherstone of SNCC, went on a speaking tour from Hokkaido in the North to Okinawa in the South. In the same year Beheiren conceived the "U.S.-Japan Citizen's Anti-War Treaty," a

people's answer to the Security Treaty, which was drawn up and signed by the participants in that year's conference. In the next year money was raised for medical supplies to be sent to Hanoi and to the NLF.

But perhaps the activity for which Beheiren is best known is the formation of JATEC, the Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to Anti-War Deserters. Beginning with the Intrepid Four, JATEC has helped sixteen American deserters to leave the country. This activity also began a process of radicalization of Beheiren's thinking, since the fact that the Japanese government, far from offering the deserters asylum, aided the U.S. government in hunting them down, dramatized the government's complicity in the war and placed Beheiren members in direct confrontation with state power.

This experience, together with such other discoveries as that 1,300,000 gallons of jet fuel pass daily by train through central Tokyo enroute to U.S. bases and Vietnam, led not only Beheiren but most of the Japanese left to realize that the war was not a far-off event to be opposed only for humanitarian reasons, but something quite close to home. It became increasingly clear that the Japanese political economy was structurally linked to the war, and that, by extension, the Japanese people were, however involuntarily, accomplices. People began talking about what came to be called "The Vietnam within ourselves."

This development has been accompanied both by a rapid growth of Beheiren and by a radicalization of its activities. In particular Beheiren is spending less time in conferences and more in the streets. Some chapters have organized demonstrations directly against bases both on the main islands and on Okinawa. Others have been active in recent university struggles. Many members traveled south to Kyushu to demonstrate in front of Omura Shuyōjo, the government's concentration camp for Korean residents. But particularly exemplary of Beheiren's style is the Folk Guerrilla movement, which began in Tokyo's Shinjuku Station. Every Saturday night young Beheiren members would gather outside the west exit with their guitars, sing folk songs and speak, gathering crowds of up to 5000. The Riot Police finally drove the singers out of Shinjuku by beatings and midnight arrests but this has only caused Folk Guerrilla to become more Guerilla-like and start spreading to local areas. The movement has produced a new slogan, now seen on posters and leaflets everywhere; Hiroba! which literally means "wide place" or "plaza," but as a slogan contained the implication of a liberated zone.

Beheiren is often criticized, of course, for its lack of ideology. The June 15 demonstration stands as a powerful argument against such criticism: among all the ideological parties and sects, there is none which could organize an action in which all others would participate. But there is another reason for avoiding ideology. In Japan's highly developed society, repression and alienation do not appear clearly and dramatically in a single aspect of social life (as for example in a sharp class distinction), but are rather spread evenly and somewhat vaguely throughout all aspects of living. It is extremely difficult to tell where peace ends and war begins, or where oppression ends and victimization begins. Similarly, for the individual it is difficult to discover just how far his work and his mode of life are contributing, directly or indirectly, to the war in Vietnam, to the oppression of Okinawa, and so on. Similar vagueness is found in all social and human relationships, as well as in the fuzzy political rhetoric of the established political parties. Traditional Marxism may be able to explain all this structurally, but it does not at this point provide a philosophy which is grounded in the direct daily life experience of most Japanese.

This vagueness is a result of the degree to which the system has penetrated the individual, making him mainly an object of external forces. Beheiren's idea is that the first step in overcoming this is not explanation but direct action. By making a clear decision to resist, by acting out his own direct action program, the individual first eliminates the vagueness from himself, and then discovers that the social situation surrounding him is also clarified, not on paper but in fact. Thus in a society in which buck-passing is the traditional mode of dissipating creative energy, Beheiren's first principle is truly regenerative and liberating: "When you advocate something, you must be the first to do it."

In a very real sense, then, Beheiren, as well as the Zenkyoto student movement and the Anti-War Youth Committee (a young workers movement) which share similar ideas, are manifestations of an ongoing cultural revolution in Japan. One of the failings of an over-ideological approach is that all liberation, including that of the individual, is relegated to some more or less distant time in the future. The principle of spontaneous action, on the other hand, offers the individual immediate, though of course not complete, liberation in the midst of the action itself. And with the appearance in the midst of the "vague" society of masses of people who have rid themselves of that vagueness and who have transformed themselves from passive functionaries to active human beings, the true nature of the entire system is made clearly visible to all who look.

No one can say now where this cultural revolution will lead. It is quite possible that a new ideology will emerge from it which will be grounded in the experience of modern life. It is quite possible that the 1970 treaty struggle will force it into more rigidly political lines. But in any case it has already served the function of exploding political ferment out of the rigid sectarianism within which it had been imprisoned, and in that sense one could say that the Revolution here has already begun.

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(Continued from page 1)

prevent his visit. Sato has stated that he is "puzzled" by these attempts to prevent his departure, pointing out that it was the left, after all, that had been demanding the return of Okinawa. And indeed, to one who has not studied the situation closely, it might seem that the Japanese government is taking quite a progressive stance...not only demanding the return of the islands, but also insisting that nuclear weapons be removed from them and that they be subject to the "prior consultation" clause of the Security Treaty (i.e., the clause that states the U.S. cannot launch attacks from the bases on Japanese soil without first consulting the Japanese government).

But what may look "progressive" on the surface takes on quite a different appearance when subjected to careful analysis. The Okinawa deal is an extremely complex tangle of co-operation, manipulation, and blackmail. It is the purpose of this article to attempt to clarify the situation.

In 1945 Japan was an imperial power. With her defeat in the war, her empire was dismantled, and the U.S. even went so far as to make some attempts to reform...though not to fundamentally alter...the political and economic structure from which imperialism had sprung. However, by 1947 with the advent of the cold war, the U.S. began to see Japan not as an enemy to be weakened but as a potential ally to be strengthened. From this point began what came to be known as the "reverse course", in which the Liberal Democratic government, quite willingly following America's urging, began rebuilding the army, the great industrial combines, the police force, and the bureaucratic and propagandistic structure that had once so effectively controlled the population. But during this phase the imperialistic structure was divided, with the outer, primarily military, structure controlled by the U.S., and the inner, primarily economic, structure controlled by Japan. It is this peculiar division of labor that has lent credence to the image of Japan as the most "peace-loving" of nations -- a myth which is blind to the fact that the two structures, inner and outer, are locked together and interdependent.

Japan's postwar course was ceremoniously launched in 1952 when then Prime Minister Yoshida decided to sign a peace treaty only with the Western powers, leaving out China and Russia. It was also at this time that Okinawa was sold down the river: the government officially acknowledged U.S. occupation of the island for an indefinite period in return for the peace treaty.

While the people of the island and the left on the mainland have been agitating for years for an end to U.S. military rule, the Liberal Democratic government for a long time made no mention of the issue, being quite rightly embarrassed about having traded off one million of their people. But suddenly in 1965 Prime Minister Sato began bringing it up. Should this be interpreted as a change of heart? A concession to popular will? Certainly not, and in fact quite the contrary. What had happened was that Sato had discovered that the Okinawa issue could be turned to the advantage of policies quite different from those advocated by the people who had been urging Okinawa's return.

ONE MILLION HOSTAGES

First of all, Sato realized that the Okinawa issue provided an ideal opportunity to blackmail and possibly divide the Left. Thus in raising the issue he has attempted to define it in such a way as to present the country with a false choice: either Okinawa is returned with U.S. bases intact, or it cannot be returned at all. Thus it is by no means a coincidence that the negotiations for return have been intensified just before 1970 and that the target return date is just after. The purpose is to create a contradiction between the goal of returning Okinawa and that of destroying the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, thus forcing the Left into an agonizing dilemma: either they must abandon the treaty fight, or else they must fight against the aspirations of their Okinawan(1) brothers. Sato and his party have spared no effort or funds to try to convince the public that this is in fact that the nature of the choice...the argument has been the subject of a major propaganda campaign operating through speaking tours, T.V., and newspapers. It has now become quite the fashion for the conservatives to exude sympathy for the plight of the Okinawans. However this extremely skillful political play of the Sato government is falling at the most important point, on Okinawa itself. The Okinawan people, instead of playing the part of good hostages and begging for return at all cost, are increasingly turning their energies against the U.S. bases and demanding their removal. The slogan "Okinawan return" is being replaced by "Okinawan liberation", and last fall a general strike against the bases was narrowly averted only by last minute threats and maneuvering by the U.S. Administration, with the help of Sato's government.

"READJUSTING" THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE STATE

Prime Minister Sato's Okinawa policy is not limited, however, to using it as a means of blackmailing the people into accepting the status quo. On the contrary, it is his hope to use the issue to help him bring about certain fundamental positive changes in the nation's political stance. As Sato himself put it in a recent speech:

Until reversion the Okinawa problem is chiefly a question of diplomacy. However once reversion has been realized, this will have an effect on the living attitudes and ways of thinking of the Japanese people, as well as on the position of Japan in the world... In other words, as Japanese State (*kokka*) is rediscovered as a new community with a unique role to play in international society, I believe that at the same time it will become necessary to reexamine the relationship between the State and the individual from a new angle. (*Asahi Shimbun*, 9/25/69)

Sato follows this with the Kennedy-like statement that the people, "rather than simply criticizing the present and demanding services from the State, should also correctly recognize the role of the individual in serving

society in a spirit of social solidarity."

These statements are of course quite vague, but given the tradition in Japan behind such things as the political demand for "social solidarity" they are extremely ominous. They are even more ominous when taken in the context of the concrete trends at work in the establishment. (2)

"EQUAL PARTNERSHIP"

There has been much talk recently both in the U.S. and in Japan about this country "taking a greater role in the affairs of Asia". In Washington this has characteristically been expressed in terms of the response expected in return for a policy of kindness: America has been "helping Japan along", but now that she is "mature" she must start "paying her own way". State Department Professor Robert Scalapino put it in this remarkable way at a conference in Kyoto last February: "The Age of American Largess pointing at the rising GNP ("third in the world" as we hear at least ten times a day), with the argument that Japan must assume a stance in world affairs "appropriate" to her re-emergence as a world power.

What does all this rhetoric mean, in plain terms? Japan, under the protection of the U.S. military "umbrella", has rebuilt much of her economic empire in Asia. The safety of this empire depends of course on the continued existence of reactionary governments in the Asian countries, and those governments depend in turn upon outside military and economic support. At present these governments are primarily propped up by the U.S., with the British taking primary responsibility for Malaysia. Now the British have announced that they are going to remove all their military forces from Asia by 1972, and the U.S. has lost the war in Vietnam and is starting to talk about general withdrawal. The U.S., for reasons both of economics and of internal politics, is increasingly urgent in requesting Japan to take over part of the military and Japan, on the other hand, has an economy which has become both too large and too entangled in the countries of Asia to continue its exclusive dependence on the American politico-military framework. Thus "equal partnership" means joint management of the empire, joint responsibility for "defense", remembering that what "defense" really means is not safeguarding the homeland but insuring the security of overseas holdings, and, by extension, of the reactionary governments upon which the security of those holdings depends. "Defense" means defense of unpopular governments against their people. And one would do well to remember the military truism recently repeated by one of Japan's important military men: "The best defense," said Lt. General Michio Utsunomiya, a former Zero pilot, "is a good offense."

MITSUYA: THREE ARROWS

Of course none of this is stated openly and frankly by the rulers... the Japanese public is not yet ready to tolerate the alteration of the constitution which would be required in order to send military forces abroad. But it is constantly alluded to. Sato has repeated again and again that the return of Okinawa is going to mark a major change in Japan's "position in the world" and in the national consciousness; his favorite slogan is "the postwar period will not end until Okinawa is returned." As this summer's political seminar of Nikkeiren (the Employer's Association) put it, "Japan is still a semi-state. She must be made into a full state."

Some indication of the kind of future these men are capable of planning was revealed by a joint Japan-U.S. military exercise carried out on paper in 1963, called Mitsuya, or three arrows. It was planned as a response to the hypothetical situation that the military dictatorship in South Korea was in danger, and involved Japanese and American units going to war in Korea, Japan placed under Martial Law, and Japanese police and military suppressing the expected riots. "These arrows remain poised today, with the tension on the bowstring increasing: two aimed at Korea, the third at the people of Japan. (3)

THE OKINAWA DEAL

It is important not to be fooled by political theatrics. All this "demanding" and "conceding" between co-conspirators Sato and Nixon is for home consumption. If Nixon decides to return Okinawa it will be because he is convinced not only that the U.S. bases there will not be handicapped by this move, but also that it will be an important step toward Japanese military growth. Japanese Self Defense forces have already traveled to the island for training, and it has been publicly announced that immediately upon reversion units will be sent there for permanent stationing.

Thus the Okinawa negotiations are a sort of shadow show. Sato demands the right of prior consultations, but it is clear that he will always say "yes". Nixon demands a promise that Japan would say "yes" to bombing runs to Vietnam in case the war is still going on in 1972 and has staked everything on ending it before then. But there is nothing in their plan which will fundamentally alter the condition of the Okinawans, whose island is crushed under the weight of huge military bases. There will of course be important symbolic changes, but concretely they will move from unilateral to joint military management.

THE STRUGGLE FOR OKINAWAN LIBERATION

A thorough analysis of the structure within which the Okinawa deal is taking place is a necessary condition for effective opposition. A negative example is provided by the Japan Communist Party. The J.C.P. has attempted to ground both its opposition to Ampo and its support for Okinawan return in the sentiment of nationalism rather than on an international opposition to imperialism. As one might have expected, this dangerous position has been easily undermined by Sato's recent moves, and the J.C.P., left without any compelling argument against present reversion plans, may be effectively co-opted.

The Japanese New Left groups...students, young workers, and citizens groups such as Beheiren...while disagreeing over many aspects of the Okinawa question, are united in basing their policies on an international anti-imperialist position, rather than emphasizing the easily co-optable demand for "early return of Okinawa." We oppose the use of Okinawa as a counterrevolutionary military base whether that base is manned by American troops, Japanese troops, or jointly by both. Thus we recognize that Okinawa will not be liberated until all bases are removed both there and on the mainland, which in turn will not be possible until the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is smashed.

This article is the first part in a projected series, the purpose of which will be to provide a radical analysis of political, economic, and military meaning of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition to this first section on the relation of Ampo to the Okinawa problem, the following articles are planned:

Ampo and Economics: Japan's investment in Asia
Ampo and the rebirth of Japan's "military-industrial complex"
Ampo and Korea
Ampo and its place in U.S. policy

(Continued on page 12)

Interviews Makoto Oda

(Continued from page 2)

ODA: Yeah I guess Japanese is better. Will you translate for me? I'd very grateful. (laughs)

AMFO: You know we're going to put all this in. (more laughter)

ODA: The peace movement... or the anti-war movement... was built primarily from the standpoint of the Victims. From that position you can just make the general statement that war is there and we as its victims must oppose it. In particular in Japan, with regard to the Pacific War... the Second World War... I think this has been a good thing in a sense. On the whole the Japanese people were victims in World War II. And so the Japanese movement after the war began from the position that we never again want to be the victims. This starting point, and its connection with the world situation... we were very afraid of the possibility of nuclear war... and this was the time of the Cold War... and if a nuclear war did occur, there was absolutely nothing we could do... we would be completely in the position of victims. Therefore it was quite natural that we began from the viewpoint of victims.

I suppose this was true everywhere... though it may have been different in America. America had such great power, and was almost omnipotent in relation to the rest of the world, and the American peace movement had to take that into account.

Actually when the Japanese peace movement began, the American peace movement was almost nonexistent. On the other hand, one of the important sources of the origin of the peace movement was the socialist countries. The Soviet peace movement also took the position of the victims, since in the war they had been the victims of the Nazis. Later this standpoint was distorted by their national policy. But again it was natural that when the Japanese peace movement began after the war it looked to the socialist peace movement as its powerful backer. On the whole that was the position of the Japanese peace movement within the world context until recently. And I think this contained a great disadvantage. And this disadvantage has become increasingly clear. First of all, our memory of war is fading away. And, again, the peace movement in the socialist countries has been pretty much distorted by national interest. And this distortion has been projected directly into the Japanese peace movement. This led to splits within the movement here. It was just at this point that we began our movement.

Another factor is that Japan has become a prosperous country. When we began our movement it was right after the Olympic games here. The Olympic games occurred right at the point when the "Economics-first policy", which followed the 1960 Treaty struggle, bore its greatest fruit. It was then that we began our movement. At that time we still were operating on the ideas, left over from the old peace movement, that we never again wanted to be victims. But in the process of the movement itself we began to realize that we felt our position to be different from that of the old peace movement. We began to realize that the Japanese state had become powerful enough to be in the position of the oppressor. And as this became increasingly clear, we began to think about the actual basis of the peace movement. We saw that we had to fundamentally reexamine the basis of the movement. Our position is typified by that of the Japanese workers on an Okinawan air base. Whenever they try to strike they find themselves facing a bayonet, and from this point of view they are entirely in the position of victims; but at the same time if you ask what they are actually doing, you find that they are loading bombs on B52s. This symbolizes the position of the people of Japan, and to some extent the position of all the people of the world. For example American soldiers are victims insofar as they have been drafted by the U.S. government, but at the same time they are sent to Vietnam where they act as oppressors.

This kind of mechanism can be found everywhere in the world, and any people's peace movement... I'm not talking about government supported peace movements, those are all phoney... the people's peace movement, whether it likes it or not, must enter this mechanism. The position of the people of the world is very weak, and in general they cannot avoid following the course set for them by those in power. In this sense they are in the position of victims. But at the same time, by being forced into this position, they become oppressors to others... for example people in other countries or other people in the same society.

This point Behrelen brought in not only to citizen's movements, but also to the student and labor movement. This is point one; now point two...

TSURUMI: (interpreting)... You never have to raise any questions, you see; he just talks and talks.

ODA: (laughing) All right, you raise a question so I can stop.

AMFO: OK, uh...

ODA: A very long one. (laughing, to Tsurumi) I enjoyed talking... I enjoyed forcing you to translate.

TSURUMI: Now to whom do you want me to charge this?

ODA: You'll charge nothing maybe... I hope.

AMFO: I'll say it in English. This analysis of oppressor and victim is very interesting also for Americans and particularly students, because there's a similar kind of debate going on in America. The Black people of course find themselves completely in the position of the victim, whereas the original white movement in America took completely the position of the oppressor, its political action was from the standpoint of the oppressor, and therefore radical politics in those days meant that you should have sympathy. Now the, especially the radical students, find themselves in both positions. Within the university they are the victims, with respect to the draft and going into the army they are the victims, but with respect to the Black people they are the oppressor. So people would be very interested in this analysis, and especially if you have found a way of acting and escaping this double position. How does Behrelen act to escape...

ODA: (Speaks in English for the remainder of the interview. Tsurumi, who has heard the rap many times, doses in his chair). Very difficult to escape from that mechanism of course. I think that theoretically speaking, I think that principally speaking you cannot escape from this kind of mechanism at all. It's almost impossible, or it's completely impossible, theoretically speaking. Always you have to try that, you see. I think that we have been trying our best, not to escape, you see, but to cut off this kind of mechanism. I mean, if you are a human being who is existing in this society, it means that you have to be, out of necessity you are a kind of accomplice to any crimes which the society is committing. So it's a kind of eternal revolution, you see. When you think you have cut yourself off from the position of the oppressor, then you find out that you are still in the position of the oppressor.

So you can go to the extreme. If you go to the extreme you have to commit suicide in this society. But at the same time if you understand you have to be alive in this society this means you have to commit some kinds of crimes always. So we are quite rigid about ourselves, but at the same time we have a kind of tolerance about what others are doing. This kind of tolerance is another of the characteristics of Behrelen. And one of the defects of radical movements all over the world is that such movements lack tolerance. But you have been here and you have witnessed many kinds of debate and situations which we have had these days. Of course you have gotten some kind of

understanding of what we are doing. So that theoretically speaking we are quite rigid about ourselves... ourselves, you see, about ourselves, but at the same time we have some kind of tolerance about what other people are doing. So that one of the main principles of Behrelen is that we do not want to make a criticism without our own doing. When you want to do something, then you start...

TSURUMI: That's our own commitment to action.

ODA: Yes, right. When you want to do something, you have to do it, and without making any stupid complaints about what others are doing. That's the characteristic of the radical movement all over the world. So the ...

AMFO: The complaining is the characteristic...?

TSURUMI: Or more or less criticizing the...

ODA: Criticizing the others, you see; "you are not so radical," or "you are doing nothing," or "you are doing stupid things," or something like that. Always people say to others. I've never said, I just smile, I just laugh. (laughing) Partly because I don't think I'm doing much, you see, in the first place. I think I'm a human being, so if I want to sleep, I sleep. That's our principle too. If you want to get a rest, it's alright, nobody complains about it.

And so there are many kinds of actions at the same time inside of Behrelen. Somebody is devoting himself to helping the Korean Mr. Min. And somebody is doing other things, publishing Shuken Amfo and so on, having some stupid debate about editorial staff (referring to the meeting which had just finished) (laughing) and also there are many kinds of actions at the same time, you see. I think that such kind of actions at the same time are quite necessary.

Now I think the radical movement in Japan... not radical, the progressive movement in Japan... and all over the world, maybe... has two kinds of extremes. One extreme is to want to have military uprisings, to resort to military weapons, to violence, direct violence, and they want to have a kind of revolutionary war or something like that. This is one extreme. And another extreme we might have is the situation created by the (Japan) Socialist Party or the (Japan) Communist party or Sohyo... too much belief in the parliamentary system, or in elections. When they conduct a demonstration it's a kind of ritual. It's a kind of festival, you see. It doesn't have any kind of political influence, upon the government or upon the people. They just make a march; I went down to Sasebo and found that they are making a very glamorous march, without doing anything. Just a march. So we have this extreme, and we have this extreme, but as true human beings we think we are standing in between, you see. This between is having a very dubious position, of course, naturally. This dubious position is most important for us. In the first place, politically speaking this is very important for us. Judging from the situation that the society has now here, or in the United States, this kind of dubious position is very important, politically speaking. And also ideologically speaking, or theoretically speaking, this dubious position is very important for me too. Because it can represent the characteristics of human beings. If you are a human being, if you are human enough, you have to admit this kind of dubious position of human beings. So this is my philosophy. And also this is my political tactics. So this is a combination, and this combination has moved Behrelen, and also I think... I hope... this combination has moved the Japanese people... to some extent.

AMFO: You used the word "revolution," a little while ago. Would you describe yourself as a revolutionary?

ODA: I don't think so. I just... what I'm concerned with...

TSURUMI: He's a social democrat.

ODA: Yes, I claim that I am a social democrat, and (laughing) he claims that he is an anarchist, and everybody claims something, see? Very strange movement. But in my own sense, of course, I'm a social democrat, in my own sense. But my main concern... I had a very funny talk with a so-called revolutionary, revolutionary theorist. He attacked me, saying that we have no revolutionary theory, or something like that... we have no revolutionary planning for the future. So I thought, "Oh, I think maybe he made a good point." So after that I said to him, "I have no revolution at all. But since you are a revolutionary, you can have some kind of practical plan." He said, "No, I have no revolution either." A very stupid talk. But it represents something, you see. At that time I said to him, my main concern is to attack the Security Treaty, and to try to destroy the Security Treaty, and also to restore Okinawa to us, not to the hands of the Sato government, but to us. These are my main concerns. Through this... through destroying the Security Treaty, and through returning Okinawa to Japan, to us, through these, we could achieve some kind of changes of society. This is most important. People can say they are revolutionary, but they are doing the same things... they want to destroy the security treaty, and they want to return Okinawa, and so on and so on. So whether I am a revolutionary or not is beyond my ability, is beyond my... how do you say... I'm not interested in that, in whether I'm a revolutionary or not, you see.

And if I say revolution, you see, revolution includes the complete change of human beings too, and this complete change means... how do you say... the liberation of human charac... human psych... human beings, human spirit... based on the dubiousness of human beings. (Laughs) Very strange. I sound very religious. Maybe I can start a religion.

AMFO: Don't you think that if you did succeed in all of your demands of smashing the Security Treaty and having the return of Okinawa under the conditions that you would like the return of Okinawa, and if all of the necessary consequences of those actions occurred, don't you think there would be a revolution in Japan?

ODA: Yes, I think that there would be the beginning of a revolution at least. And this can include many kinds of changes of society. I think this must have included many kinds of changes of society.

TSURUMI: You see... in that the Vietnam war has actually been injected into this country, and we began to realize the connection between the Japanese people and the war in Vietnam: there is a link, and that is Okinawa. And fighting more radically and totally in the Japanese anti-war movement, we began to realize that... well, we are in close recognition of the problem of the Koreans here, or the segregated people here, the Buraku and so on.

AMFO: What about cultural revolution?

ODA: If I say... do you mean the cultural revolution in Japan, or in China?

AMFO: In Japan.

ODA: In Japan. So I said to you, if I say revolution, revolution includes many kinds of changes of human characters, of human beings based (laughing again) on the dubiousness of human beings. So let me put it in this way... if I say revolution, of course revolution includes cultural revolution, in the various phases of society and in various phases of human beings themselves... included in this term, revolution.

AMFO: Do you think there is a cultural revolution going on in Japan right now?

ODA: A little bit, yes.

AMPO: In what respect?

ODA: For example, I mean...just...all over the world you can notice a very strange phenomenon, which I call the hippy phenomenon. So people want to drop from history. Any people want to drop. In the past, people had to be included, to be involved in history, you see. So they could not escape, they could not stay away from history, which is made by big people...or by big nations. At that time, in the past, the people, all over the world, maybe, the people including the socialist countries, of course including Japan, had not attained a standard of living sufficient to keep them alive, physically and spiritually, you see. But rather it seems to me, in the so-called advanced countries, so-called advanced countries, it seems to me that the people have attained some kind of standard of living to keep them alive physically and spiritually, even if they stay away from the mainstream of the society. And they can have a say now, they can have a say now.

And also the society...the morale and the logic of the society...is shaky now, all over the world. For example, when we traveled in Hokkaido, we were making a speaking tour campaign, you see, we want to...what do you call it in English? (a brief discussion to figure out the English word) school for delinquents, we went there, and we had a very strange discussion with the head, with the principal of that school, very strange discussion, you see (laughing)...he put a question, a very strange question (pointing to Yamaguchi, a young Beheiren member)... (in Japanese) What did you ask him anyhow? Whether there is a right to commit crime, wasn't it?

YAMAGUCHI: That's right, that's right.

ODA: (continuing in English) The principal himself is a very good person, very naive, and a very good person, I think. And he has devoted his life to...how do you say...to improving the character of the delinquents at that school. I think he is quite a good person. But he put a question, do people have a right to commit crimes? If he had said this in the past, ten years ago or something like that, the principal could have answered promptly, you are wrong, you see...he could say that, promptly. But at that time he could not say any answer. Of course, he answered, but obviously...it seems to me...he did not think that his answer was based upon a quite strong logical stand, you see. So the logic and the morals of the society are quite shaky. Whereas in the past, if you find a hippy, walking on the street, you can say, you are wrong, you have to come back to the establishment and to work, seriously, or something like that, you can say it, with true confidence. But right now you don't think you can say that with true confidence. Of course you can say it, but at the same time, you feel some kind of... how do you say...anxiety about your answer, when you say you have to come back and work seriously. The young man can say that to return to the establishment, to the mainstream of society, is to commit crimes against the Vietnam people and against the people under the society or at the bottom of the society. He can say that with true confidence, it seems to me. So it's a kind of strange...strange uprooting of the values of society now. I cannot say which is true or not, but anyhow this kind of change is taking place, and this is very important. So for example one of my friends who is a lawyer, very recently he decided to defend the case of the drug addicts. And his standpoint is like this; he conceived his theory...according to his theory...I think...everyone has a right to be degenerated...(laughing)...to degenerate himself, you see. I think it's quite a good theory. But in the past, if you say this, you can say of course that it's very stupid, but now you don't think you can say that, you can say that it's very stupid, with true confidence. This is the situation of society all over the world. And also to stop the committing of suicide, we don't think that to stop people from committing suicide is based on a very logical stand, right now, you see. (noticing the expression on AMPO reporter's face) Maybe you have your problem too (laughs).

So some kind of change is taking place, and I think we are now in the darkness, but we are trying to find some values in this respect...quite completely different, maybe, or the...I don't know...some kind of change is taking place. If you call it revolution, you can call it. If you call it degeneration, it can be said like this. (laughs)

AMPO: I heard you once describe yourself as a hippy. Was that serious, or was that a joke?

ODA: OOOOOh...yesterday when I was in Kyoto, and I was at a meeting, a hippy appeared, before the public, when we had a meeting, you see, hippy had helped deserter or something

like that, I can't remember the background story, but hippy appeared...he said he is hippy, and he preached the philosophy of the hippy, and also he preached the daily life...how he conducted his daily life...hippy life, and it seems that many people are quite shocked, by the speech made by this hippy, but I was not shocked at all, because I found that his way of living is completely the same with mine, you see, my way of living is not different at all from this hippy's life. So...very strange. And philosophically speaking...I don't know...I think I am a very orthodoxical person, you see. For example, I majored in Greek classics when I was a student. (laughs) It meant that I am a very orthodoxical student. I mean...person, as a character. Also my novel is very orthodoxical. Someone said to me my novel might seem to have been written I think forty or fifty years ago. It's quite a classical work, you see. (laughs)

YAMAGUCHI: I never read it, so I wouldn't know.

TSURUMI: I read it through.

ODA: Eh? It sounds very classical, yes? Quite a strange mixture of the establishment, and hippy...maybe. This is serious, you see.

AMPO: But anyway, you have no intention of dropping out of history, I take it.

ODA: Yeah...dropping out of this history, and to make another history.

AMPO: Ahhh.

ODA: This is the difference, maybe. Of course (laughing) I don't know if I can make a history or not, I don't know at all...(still laughing) nonsense...

AMPO: To change the subject, you're planning to go to America...if you have permission to go, what will you do in America? Where are you going?

ODA: In the first place, I want to mobilize the people to make a revolution...no, no, not revolution (everyone bursts out laughing)

AMPO: Everything goes in.

ODA: ...to make, to make a demonstration against the coming of Sato...my dear Sato. And also after that, I will participate in some kind of speaking tour, maybe, where I can explain the situation of the Japanese peace movement, or the anti-war movement, or the radical movement, to the American people, American scholars and such kind of people. And also I would like to explain how dangerous, morally and physically and spiritually the Security Treaty is...for both nations, you see.

And also the problem of Okinawa, and so on. I think an alliance between the two countries is quite necessary...the two nations...I mean two peoples, two kind of people. Because of this we have had two student conferences between the two countries, one of which we had three years ago...wasn't it?...and another one we had last year. I think that was somewhat fruitful, for example to help American deserters, the idea to help American deserters, came out of the first meeting of the students of the two countries, which we had three years ago. After that we began to publish the leaflets to be distributed among the American soldiers. And also when the Intrepid Four appeared to us, with the background of the experience of conferences, we could promptly get in touch with the American peace movement. That's a good point.

AMPO: What kind of thing could the American radicals do now...what kind of thing would you like to see them do, as far as the Security Treaty is concerned?

ODA: Yes, the peace movement in total, the anti-war movement in total, including the liberal movements, and including the radical movement... I think that when we make a movement against the Security Treaty...of course we are making now...at the same time they can make many kind of demonstrations, sit ins, against the State Department, and also against the White House, and also like this, you see. It's quite obvious. But at the same time they can put the pressure on the feeling of the American people, and if they can be successful in making the feeling of the American people change, a little bit, about the foreign policy, especially in Asia, in Japan too, ...also they don't, the American people don't know anything about the situation in Asia, the Japanese situation, and including the situation of Korea, and the situation of Okinawa, of course. So they...I think they are quite naive. They...if the American movement can have some strong movement, directly against the Security Treaty and the Okinawa problem, for example when Mr. Sato comes to the United States, if they can have a very strong demonstration against the coming of Sato.

And also some kind of alliances between the two countries is made, or has already been made. One of the examples, when the deserter, one deserter, was arrested in Kyoto, and he was taken by the military police of the United States, and he was taken...we expected that he would be taken to the International Airport of Osaka to be taken from the airport to the American base in Tokyo...but he was taken to the Shimmeiwa Kogyo, a compound of the private industry, you see, which is a very notorious company, and his plane took off from the ground of this weapons factory, ... (tape changed) ...so it can signify the strange relationship between the two countries...industry, and military and political complex...international complex...has already been made between the two countries, and this strange and awful complex is having an enormous influence upon the foreign policies of both nations...and also upon the foreign policy of Korea, and other parts of Asia. And the foreign policy of Korea has an enormous influence upon the domestic policy of Korea. This means that this foreign policy has enormous influence upon the daily life of the Korean people. So the American people must realize this... that the situation of the American people is deeply connected with the situation of the Korean people, you see. So I think that this kind of military, political, and economic complex is very awful, and so now the American peace movement can attack it, either directly, or indirectly by making the American people understand this strange awful international complex...which is playing a very important role in deciding the foreign policy of their own nation too.

AMPO: The last question. What do you think will happen in 1970? Can the Security Treaty be smashed?

ODA: I laugh. (He does)

AMPO: What do you think will happen in 1970?

ODA: Many things will happen, you see. Many, many things will happen. So even if... let me put it in this way...we try the best, and also, even if we cannot do that, that is, to smash the security treaty, if we try the best, I think we can have some kind of good effects upon our future movement. Otherwise the Security Treaty can for many years. If we try the best next year, or this year, I think the Security Treaty can disappear within, I don't know, within several years. I'm quite sure about that. Because of the change of the international situation. And the change of the international situation is partly caused by what we are doing...and by what we are going to do, I hope, and I believe.

AMPO: Isn't it true that the Security Treaty can probably never be smashed without a strong movement against it also in America?

ODA: I think so...without a very strong movement in America the Security Treaty cannot be smashed at all. We need the cooperation of the American movement...a strong one, you see, quite need it. And also our movement is needed by the...I think...by the American movement too, for the future of the United States.

AMPO: That's a good ending.

ESSENTIAL

Ampo -- abbreviated form of "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty"

JAPANESE

Ampo funsai! -- smash the Ampo!

PHRASES

kidotai -- riot police

kidotai kaere! -- riot police go home!

Okinawa kaiho! -- liberate Okinawa!

Betonamu ni heiwa o! -- peace in Vietnam!

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(Continued from page 9)

Thus rather than agonizing over the false choice which Sato has tried to present us, we are concentrating on overthrowing his entire regime by mass direct action. Our position on the Sato-Nixon talks is quite simple: we plan to undertake mass action to prevent Sato's departure from Japan. Should he manage to slip through our lines we are hoping that our American brothers will act to prevent his entry into their country or, failing that, to prevent his return to Japan.

Footnotes

- (1) The word "Okinawan" is used in this article in the sense of "Osakan" or "Californian," and should not be construed as implying that the people living on Okinawa are other than Japanese. Okinawa is a prefecture of Japan and the one million people there are Japanese.
- (2) These statements have of course been echoed by many members of the Establishment. For example the president of the Fuji Bank recently stated, "The year 1970 is not a goal. It is rather a new starting line for the 1970's in which the systems of national security, politics, and economics in this country will be seriously and drastically changed." And in a recent article in English, Kiichi Saeki, president of the Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics and former director of the National Defense College, wrote that "greater emphasis should be placed on efforts to make national defense a matter of national concern in its truest sense. What are important are the spiritual or intellectual efforts to rally the support of the whole people behind the cause of national defense..." He goes on to caution, however, that in this modern age, defense questions must be "endorsed by rational considerations based on a correct understanding of an a deep insight into the internationalist environment, as well as on complex technological knowledge of defense in the nuclear age." He concludes that "The national energies must be mobilized in the right direction indicated by such rational considerations," a task which requires "enlightened leadership." This amounts to a quite frank call for manipulative control: First inflame nationalist passions, second harness those passions in support of your own policies.
- (3) In this regard the statement made by Naka Funada on August 9 this year. Funada, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party's Security Council since 1962 and also chairman of the Defense Production Committee, called for an increase in the defense budget from 1% to 4% of the GNP, and then went on to make the following remarks: War on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait is unavoidable in the future, and Japan, as a big Power, must shoulder responsibility for the situation there. For that purpose, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty must be consolidated and the Self-Defense Forces drastically strengthened. But even this is not enough. The existing Self-Defense Forces should be turned into the skeleton of the future Japanese Armed Forces by promoting all soldiers to the rank of non-commissioned officer. To back these active forces, a militia of 1,000,000 young men should be organized all over the country which can be brought under the command of the present Self-Defense Forces whenever an emergency arises.

Oct. 21, Anti-war Day

(Continued from page 4)

around the time of the 1960 Security Treaty crisis as the Mainstream faction of the Zengakuren, were born in an atmosphere of mistrust of the established Left -- the Socialist and Communist Parties and the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo). In their view, the established Left has degenerated in the postwar environment of high economic growth and prosperity and has been unable to carry out any effective movement. The labor unions, they feel, in their excessive emphasis on economic action, are entirely unable to carry out political struggles. These anti-JCP New Left groups armed themselves with staves for the first time on October 8, 1967, for what is known as the "First Haneda Incident." This first example of violent struggle by the New Left forces had immense repercussions through all of Japanese society. It was followed by seven months of violent upheaval, the main incidents of which were:

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- November, 1967.....the Second Haneda Struggle (to prevent the Prime Minister's departure for the U.S.)
- January, 1968.....the Sasebo Struggle (to oppose the entrance of the Enterprise, an American nuclear submarine into the port of Sasebo)
- February - May, 1968.....the Oji Struggles (opposing the establishment of an American Army hospital in the Tokyo suburbs) and the Narita Struggles (opposing the construction of a new international airport near Tokyo)

The New Left forces believe that if they mobilize their full strength for mass confrontations at each crucial historical moment, even at the risk of suffering mass arrests of their members, the very intensity of the struggle itself will communicate itself to the masses, thus bringing about an upsurge of revolutionary consciousness and opening up entirely new vistas in the history of the class struggle.

The New Left did not finally form a united front among themselves until October, 1969. The period beginning on October 10 this year and continuing through the first half of November is for them the biggest focal point of the 1970 Security Treaty struggles, and the main emphasis of this period is placed on preventing Prime Minister Sato's visit to the U.S. in November. Thus, October and November are, for them, the "prologue" to the 1970 struggles and the first stage in the decisive class struggles foreseen during the 1970's. They are calling for a continuous wave of fierce confrontations to prevent Sato's U.S. visit.

This year's Oct. 21 Anti-War Day is the fourth such day. October 21 of last year featured demonstrations in Shinjuku, at the Defence Agency, and at the Diet building. The atmosphere was charged with the increased militancy dating from Oct. 8, 1967 and spurred on by the wave of campus unrest. Last year, about 6,000 anti-JCP students and workers participated in the Oct. 21 action in Shinjuku, some 2,000 at the Defence Agency, and some 2,200 at the Diet. The demonstrations in Shinjuku were particularly vigorous, and a crowd estimated at some 200,000 persons gathered around the Shinjuku Station, a key center in the Japanese National Railways' network. A state of open insurrection ensued in the vicinity; the J.N.R. trains were stopped, the station ransacked, and electric trains burned; and the National Railways' service was paralyzed until the evening of the following day. The Riot Law (Sōranzai) was invoked at 0:15 AM. Some 948 arrests were made in Shinjuku alone, and 20 (still under detention one year later) are now being tried for allegedly "leading a riot."

The police authorities this year, fearing a repetition of last year's show of popular strength, went into action on the morning of October 21. Establishing a Supreme Headquarters, they mobilized a total of 69,000 policemen (including 5,600 plainclothesmen) throughout the nation. This number was in excess of the 51,400 police mobilized at the time of the 1960 Security Treaty disorders. Of them, 25,000 were stationed in Tokyo, 8,000 in Osaka, 4,000 in Hokkaido, and 3,400 in Fukuoka. Special anti-guerrilla units were set up for going into immediate action wherever needed, in addition to the usual units for dealing with unlicensed demonstrations. By the morning of October 20, the police had cleared away the barricades from all of the universities and high schools in Tokyo which were still occupied by insurgent students, fearing that these campuses would serve as bases for guerrilla activities. Many of the department stores and shops in downtown Tokyo closed on the 21st, and riot police were stationed at various places which were considered to be likely targets of guerrilla attacks.

The National Zenkyōtō student organizations applied for permits for holding three rallies and demonstrations, while the Anti-War Youth Committees requested permits for four such meetings. All seven requests were turned down by the authorities. The reasons for the refusals were that these organizations had called for attacks on public buildings such as the Prime Minister's residence and foreign embassies on October 21, and had in the past actually attempted to break into such buildings.

Under these conditions of strict police surveillance and refusal to permit meetings, sporadic guerrilla activities began during the morning. A number of buildings were occupied, and numerous arrests were made during the day. In the vicinity of Shinjuku station, a crowd consisting mostly of students began to gather around 3:00 PM. The crowd was strangely silent and appeared to be waiting for something. At times, the crowd reached a maximum of some 10,000 people. After 5:00 PM, the riot police began to disperse the throng. The people would merely move away from the police units, but there was no corresponding reduction in their numbers.

About 6:30 PM, approximately 3,000 people began to move towards the plaza by the east entrance of Shinjuku station. On the way, they clashed with riot police, and about 800 of them built street barricades, which they doused with gasoline and set aflame. Stones and Molotov cocktails were hurled at the police, who responded by firing cannister after cannister of tear gas. The clashes in Shinjuku lasted until after 10:00 PM at night.

Elsewhere, Molotov cocktails and rocks were thrown at 17 other places in Tokyo. Four police stations and 19 police boxes were attacked, and Molotov cocktails were thrown into the headquarters of the Seventh Riot Police Detachment. On account of the unrest, the main lines of the National Railways, as well as private railways and the Tokyo subway lines, were put out of operation for several hours, and some 350,000 commuters were deprived of transportation.

Behiren was the only New Left organization which received permission to hold a rally and demonstration on October 21. The meeting began at 5:30 PM at Shimizu-dani Park near Akasaka, and at about 6:30 groups of university students belonging to Behiren arrived after a three-hour march from another park in Ikebukuro. Behiren spokesmen estimated an attendance of 20,000 (the police claimed that 9,500 attended). Some 15 members of the Gaikokujin Behiren (an organization of foreign residents in Japan, founded in May, 1969) also participated. After the rally, the participants marched in a demonstration which culminated at the Iidabashi station, where some 2,000 Behiren students built five barricades of lumber and set fire to them.

Also on the 21st, rallies were held in 600 locations in Japan by the Old Left organizations (the Socialist and Communist Parties and Sohyo). For them also, October 21 marked the start of their own 1970 campaign against the Security Treaty. Their Tokyo rally commenced at 6:00 PM and was followed by orderly demonstrations. The Old Left's organizing committee claimed a nation-wide attendance of about 860,000. According to the National Police, 467,000 persons participated in 832 meetings held in 46 prefectures. The latter figures include both the New and Old Left. In either case, this is the first time since the 1960 Security Treaty struggles that such vast numbers of people have participated in meetings and demonstrations based on political issues.

The total number of injuries on October 21 was 66 (32 police, 22 students, and 12 ordinary citizens). The seriously injured totaled 5 (2 policemen, 2 students, and 1 ordinary citizen).

With a total number of 1,505 arrests to their credit, and after mobilizing an unprecedented 69,000 policemen, government officials appeared to be in a self-congratulatory mood on their ability to control the Japanese public. The following morning, they announced that an important obstacle to Prime Minister Sato's forthcoming visit to the United States had been overcome and expressed confidence in the ability of their riot police to suppress any future outbreaks of anti-establishment violence.